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Abstract: The fact that wineries tend to cluster in certain sub-regions can be partially explained by 
the terroir of those areas.  However, a gap in our understanding of the spatial relationships among 
wineries remains.  In this article, winery-level data with geographic information system (GIS) 
coordinates are utilized to examine the spatial relationships among neighboring wineries.  Spatial 
effects for the California and Washington wine industries are assessed by performing clustering 
tests based on wine prices and tasting scores.  A spatial lag model is then estimated to test the 
hypothesis that there are positive effects from neighbors when analyzing the hedonic price 
equations.  The regression results indicate that there exists strong and positive neighbor effect.   
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One bad wine in the valley is bad for every winery in the valley.  One good wine in the valley is 
good for everyone.  --Robert Mondavi on the Napa Valley in the 1960s (Stiler, 2007). 
 
When one examines a map with points indicating winery locations in California and 
Washington State, there is an interesting phenomenon.  Wineries are intensively located in some of 
the areas but almost none of them in others.  In other words, most of the wineries choose to locate 
close to each other.  The obvious reason for this location pattern is probably because of geographic 
features as defined by American Viticultural Area: the terroir of some regions is more suitable for 
grape growing.  Therefore, wineries prefer to select a location that can explore this resource 
advantage.  However, the reason that wineries do not evenly distribute within grape growing 
region but choose to cluster together cannot be well explained by terroir.  Therefore, a research 
question comes out naturally.  Do wineries benefit from choosing locations that are in close 
proximity to high reputation neighbor wineries? 
Many studies on wine markets have considered location as factor, but geographic 
clustering and neighborhood effects (micro-level interactions among wineries) in wine industry 
have not been fully analyzed.  The idea behind Tobler’s “First Law of Geography,” is that 
everything is related to everything else, but close things are more related than distance things 
(Tobler 1970).  Following this idea, the influence from neighbors may be quite important to a 
winery’s product prices.  4 
 
Possible reasons for winery concentrations can come from both the producer and 
consumer points of view.  First, from production side, spatial heteroscedasticity and spatial 
dependence can be the reasons.  Spatial heteroscedasticity refers to the terroir of a sub-region.  It is 
an exogenous factor.  Since a winery and its neighbors share the same grape growing conditions, it 
is possible that their products exhibit some degree of similarity in terms of their characteristics.  
This may result in similar tasting scores from wine experts, and many previous studies indicate 
that score is the most important factor in determining a wine’s price.  Spatial dependence 
represents the spillover effects of reputation and management among wineries, which are located 
in close proximity.  This is an endogenous factor:  nearby wineries usually are located in the same 
appellation, which serves as a reputation signal to the market.  Also, knowledge about how to make 
wine is easier to be communicated.  Therefore, closeby wineries are able to and willing to charge a 
similar price for their products. 
Second, from consumer’s side, perceptions about wines coming from the same area 
tend to be the similar, so it is more likely for consumer to be willing to pay similar price for wines 
from the same micro-region.  For example, if a winery with a reputation for producing extremely 
high quality wine is located close to another winery, consumers might consider the neighboring 
winery to also have high quality products.  Therefore, we cannot ignore the impacts from 
neighbors of a winery. 
According to Can (1998), spatial analysis is usually divided into two stages.  The first 
stage is the exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) stage or spatial pattern identification stage, 
which concerns description rather than explanation.  The second stage is called confirmatory data 5 
 
analysis (CDA) stage, which involves modeling the impact of spatial structure on behavior and 
outcomes in addition to economic considerations.  In this study, we will follow this framework to 
analyze the spatial effects for Washington and California wine industries by first performing 
clustering tests based on prices and tasting scores and then formally measuring neighborhood 
effects via a spatial lag model. 
Porter (2000) is the seminal article in the literature on geographic clustering analyses.  
Porter explains the literature and methods for clusters, or geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies, and their role in competition and other implications.  He argues that 
clusters represent a new way of thinking about economics, and they necessitate new roles for 
companies, government, and other institutions in enhancing competitiveness.  For the 
identification of clusters, he indicates that the ultimate determining factors of a cluster are the 
strength of the “spillovers.”  The geographic scope of a cluster is related to distance, and 
informational, transactional and other efficiencies occur over the cluster.  He also argues that all 
existing and emerging clusters deserve attention.  From an empirical point of view, Jaffe et al. 
(1993) uses patent citations to test whether the knowledge spillovers are geographically localized.  
They find that localization does exist and it slowly fades over time.  However, no previous studies 
have focused on geographical clustering of wine and its effects.  Other types of clustering analysis 
has been a major topic for some studies.  Costanigro et al. (2009) identify wine segments for 
Washington and California wines with a procedure called local polynomial regression clustering, 
which is clustering by local regression coefficients, but Geographic Information System (GIS)  
data was not used.  Kaye-Blake et al. (2007) utilize cluster analysis on potential market segments 6 
 
for genetically modified food.  However, their clusters are based on survey responses. 
For modeling spatial effects, Anselin (1999) summarizes the foundation and 
regression issues of spatial models.  In the applications of spatial model, Wu and Hendrick (2009) 
estimate a spatial lag reaction function for property tax rate of Florida municipal governments in 
2000 and 2004 and compare model fitness as well as results from different specifications of spatial 
relationships.  Garretsen and Peeters (2009) test the relevance of spatial linkages for Dutch 
(outbound) foreign direct investment (FDI).  They estimate a spatial lag model for Dutch FDI to 18 
host countries and find that third-country effects matter.  
GIS can be a helpful and powerful tool in spatial relationship studies.   As indicated by 
Can (1998), GIS enables the researcher to organize, visualize, and analyze data in a map form, 
provides the medium for the integration of multiple geographical data sets, and gives analytical 
support for spatial data analysis by providing explicit information of spatial relationships.  
Wallsten (2001) applies GIS and firm-level data to explore agglomeration and spillovers at the 
firm level over discrete distances.  He finds that the number of other firms participating in Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program within a fraction of a mile predicted whether a firm 
wins awards. 
In this article, winery-level GIS data is collected to describe the spatial relationships 
among wineries for California and Washington State wine industries.  First, we conduct formal 
statistical tests to decide whether there exists geographic winery clusters based on price and tasting 
score.  Second, a spatial lag model is applied to test the hypothesis that there is positive effect from 
neighbors when analyzing the hedonic relationships among price and other factors.  Analyses are 7 
 
done for both California and Washington State. 
Spatial analyses of California and Washington State wine industry can improve the 
understanding of the economic relationships among wine’s price and product’s attributes.  All 
previous studies about Washington and California wine industries either ignore the spatial 
autocorrelations among wineries or wine regions, or treat them as nuisance and incorporate them 
into the error structure of the regression model.  However, there is a high possibility that spatial 
autocorrelations (spatial effects), which may be the results of spatial interaction processes, 
externalities, spillover and so on, is significantly present among Washington and California 
wineries.  If we ignore the spatial nature of the data, it may lead to biased or inefficient estimates 
and misleading inference (Anselin, 1988).  Consequently, this research can help to look for a more 
appropriate econometric model to describe the relationships among price and other characteristics 
of Washington and California red wines, when considering the spatial effects from the distribution 
of hundreds of existing wineries.  
The rest of this article proceeds as following:  First, we will describe the data used in 
this study.  Second, we will introduce the econometric methods and model applied in this study, 
and the statistics test for geographic clustering.  Following these are the results and discussion.  




The data set consists of winery-level data from two States: Washington and California.  8 
 
For each observation, information about price, rating score, case, year of aging, vintage and 
production region is collected from Wine Spectator magazine (online version).  Since the observed 
unit in this study is individual winery, the above variables of price, score, case and age are 
averaged across grape varieties
1 and vintages
2 for every winery in our data set.  Indicator variables 
are used to denote the winery’s production area, representing collective reputations.  The regions 
for California wines include Napa Valley, Bay Area, Sonoma, South Coast, Carneros, 
Sierra-Foothills, Mendocino and other California.  In Washington, they are Columbia Valley, 
Yakima Valley, Walla Walla Valley, Puget Sound and other Washington. 
For Washington State, information about 79 wineries is gathered.  For California, there 
are 876 wineries in our data set. Table 1 reports the descriptive summary of non-binary variables in 
our data set and Table 2 provides short descriptions and abbreviations of all variables used in the 
empirical analyses. 
To describe the spatial property of each winery, we incorporate GIS data into our study.  
Each winery contains a name, street address, city, state and zip code.  The street address in the data 
allows us to recover each winery’s exact longitude and latitude coordinates by geocoding address 
in GIS program
3.  Following geocoding, we can obtain an accurate understanding of almost any 
                                                             
1 This study only takes red wines into concern; the grape varieties are Zinfandel, Pinot Noir, Cabernet Sauvignon, 
Merlot, Syrah grapes, and wines made from blending of different varieties (non-varietals). 
2 The vintages are from 1991 to 2000. 
3 The data set originally contains 137 wineries for Washington and 1195 for California. However, due to the difficulty 
of finding street address (e.g. some wineries only provide P.O. box or can only locate to city), and GIS’s limited ability 9 
 
spatial relationship among wineries in our data set, such as pairwise distances between any two 
wineries and the nearest K neighbors for any selected winery.  Also, we are able to obtain a visual 
understanding about the spatial distribution of wineries in both Washington and California.  
Figures 1 and 2 are winery distribution for Washington and California, respectively. 
About the spatial information of our data set, two things need to be mentioned. First, 
wine Spectator is the only source of our data set. We only include wineries whose wines are listed 
in Wine Spectator. Second, among all the wineries, in Washington State, 10.13% of them are estate 
wineries and 4.57% are estate wineries in California. Only these wineries use their own grapes to 
produce wine instead of buying them from external growers. The coordinate of each winery is 
where the producing processes take place.  
 
Method and Model 
 
There are two distinct ways to model spatial dependence: as an additional regressor in 
the form of a spatially lagged dependent variable (Wy), or in the error structure (E [ i j] 0).  The 
former one is referred as a spatial lag model and has the form of y Wy X       , and the later 
one is usually called spatial error model with the expression  yX    and  Wu     .  The 
choice of the model depends on the research interest.  When the focus of interest is to assess the 
existence and strength of spatial interaction, the spatial lag model is more appropriate, since it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
to locate some addresses, only 79 wineries from Washington and 876 wineries from California can be applied in the 
study. 10 
 
interprets the spatial dependence in a substantive form.  However, when the concern is to correct 
the potentially biasing influence of the spatial autocorrelation due to spatial data, the spatial error 
model is appropriate to meet the goal (Anselin 1988). 
The prior objective in this study is to model spatial effects in California and 
Washington State wine industries.  Therefore, it is necessary to include a specific term of 
neighborhood effect in the explanatory variables, and the spatial lag model will be a reasonable 
choice.  
Regarding other explanatory variables, we choose to include factors showing 
significant effects in many previous hedonic analyses of wine.  Therefore, the formal expression of 
our spatial lag model is 
 
0 1 2 3
3
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Where   is a spatial autoregressive coefficient, W is the spatial weight matrix that will be specified 
later.  Score is the rating score from Wine Spectator magazine, Case is the number of cases 
produced by the winery, and Age represents years of aging before commercialization.  All of these 
three variables are averaged values for the particular winery across the observation period.  Region 
tells us the place of production and each area is represented by an indicator variable.  For 
Washington State, there are four regions (j is equal to four).  The regions are the Columbia Valley, 
Yakima Valley, Walla Walla Valley and Puget Sound.  For California, there are seven macro 11 
 
regions (j = 7).  They are Napa Valley, Bay Area, Sonoma, South Coast, Carneros, Sierra-Foothills 
and Mendocino are the seven production regions. Since for both states, the region variables 
exclude Other Washington or Other California, parameter before each of them indicates the 
difference between wine from this area and a generic Washington or California wine.  
The form of the dependent variable f(Price) is determined by a Box-Cox 
transformation.  For Washington State, we use ln(Price) as our final dependent variable in the 
regression, while for California, the best transformation is Price
-0.25.  Equation (1) is estimated via 
spatial econometrics method.
4 
The specification of spatial weight matrix in spatial econometric analysis is important 
and influential to regression results.  In previous studies, Frizado et al. (2009) emphasize the 
sensitivity of spatial weights matrix selection to the cluster identification results by Local Moran’s 
and Getis-Ord Gi when concerning U.S. county size.  They conclude that the selection of spatial 
weighting methodology should depend on the study’s purpose, the distribution of county sizes, and 
the industry being studied.  Also, Anselin (1999) points out that the elements of the weights matrix 
are non-stochastic and exogenous to the model.  Typically, they are based on the geographic 
arrangement of the observations, or contiguity.  Several forms of spatial weights are analyzed in 
literature, such as inverse distance or inverse distance squared (Anselin, 1980), structure of a social 
network (Doreian, 1980), economic distance (Case, Rosen and Hines,1993) and K nearest 
neighbors (Pinkse and Slade, 1998).  
However, the specification of spatial weights is not arbitrary.   The range of 
                                                             
4 See Anselin (1988) 12 
 
dependence allowed by the structure of W must be constrained.  Therefore, the key question in 
every spatial econometric analysis is how to define the range of the neighborhood. Intuitively, if 
the units all belong to one cluster, then distance decay will be a reasonable choice of spatial 
weights because it treats all units as neighbors.  However, when units are distributed as several 
“hot spots” in space, only consider distance weight will not be a good candidate.  Since treating a 
far-away point, which belongs to another cluster, as neighbor does not make sense.  Also, to avoid 
confusing the exogeneity of weights, deriving weights geographically is more appropriate. 
Therefore, based on the geographic distribution of California and Washington State 
wineries, we select K nearest neighbors
5 as the structure of our spatial weight matrix. As the 
empirical standard of model selection, we also compare Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) of 
models with different spatial weight matrix and find that the K nearest neighbors structure that 
results in the best AIC value.  The AIC measurements have also been applied in a number of 
spatial analyses as mentioned in Anselin (1988, page 247). 
 
Clustering Test (Global Moran’s I) 
 
Before proceeding to the spatial econometric analysis, it is necessary to get an 
approximate idea of how well the geographic connection is among wineries.  Formal measurement 
of trends in spatial pattern can be accomplished by spatial association (or autocorrelation) statistics.  
The most common one to identify geographic cluster is Moran’s I statistic, which is derived from a 
                                                             
5 Only the nearest K wineries are considered to have influence on the interest winery. 13 
 
statistic developed by Moran (1948, 1950a, 1950b).  Also there are Geary’s c, Gamma, Gi and Gi
* 
as summarized by Anselin (1998).  In the literature, geographic cluster analysis is widely applied 
in housing market.  Anselin and Can (1995) use an exploratory spatial approach to the examination 
of spatial structure in 1990 mortgage originations for Dade County, Florida.  They apply local 
spatial association statistics to identify areas that exhibit statistically significant clustering of high 
and low levels of mortgage activity (i.e., “hot spots”). 
In this study, we are interested in testing the general connection among all wineries 
from a State.  Therefore, to evaluate whether wineries’ spatial distribution pattern expresses 
clustered, dispersed, or random, Global Moran’s I statistics is appropriate.  Also, geographic 
connection can be based on many aspects; the ones we choose in this study are wine’s price and 
rating score.  





ij i j ij
ij i i j i
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where N is the number of spatial units indexed by i and j; X is the variable of interest, here is wine’s 
price premium;  X is the mean of X, or the mean of price premium; and wij is a matrix of spatial 
weights, which are defined by K nearest neighbors criteria. 
Values of Global Moran’s I range from -1 (indicating perfect dispersion) to +1 (perfect 
clustering).  Inference for Global Moran’s I is based on a normal approximation.  The Z-score 14 
 
value is calculated to decide whether to reject the null hypothesis that there is no spatial clustering.  
If the threshold significance level is set at 0.05, then a Z score would have to be less than –1.96 or 
greater than 1.96 to be statistically significant. 
For this study, the results from Global Moran’s I tests of price and score for 
Washington State and California are showed in Table 3 and 4.  The K nearest neighbors spatial 
weight matrix is in use, and K is from 1 to 5 for Washington and between the range of 1 to 65 for 
California.  The way to decide number of K will be discussed later.  From the results, no matter 
how many neighbored wineries are considered, both price and score exhibit positive clustering 
distribution at the global level.  Also, by comparing the Moran’s I values, price clustering is 
stronger than score clustering.  
A Global Moran’s I test can be considered as a spatial pattern identification test.  From 
the results, we can obtain a general understanding about the degree of spatial connection among 
winery’s product price and quality (represent by tasting score) for both States. 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Estimation results are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 for Washington State and 
California, respectively.  Results are reported based on the choice of spatial weight matrix.  The 
parameter  represents the degree of spatial effect among wineries.  The probability values for 
each estimate are in parenthesis.  For ease of comparison, we also provide estimation results from 
hedonic model without spatial lag term.  They are presented in the last column of each table. 15 
 
In the last row of Table 5 and 6, we compare the models based on their AIC.  The 
model with the smallest AIC is highlighted.  Also, three statistical tests (Wald, Likelihood Ratio 
and Lagrange Multiplier tests) are conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that there is no significant 




For Washington State, we consider the nearest neighbors to be the closest 1 to 5 
wineries.  Therefore, K is less or equal to 5 in the spatial weight matrix.  The reason for considering 
K in this range is that the AIC values a minimum point at K = 3 in this range.  Three wineries 
represent about 4% of the total wineries that are listed for Washington state in the Wine Spectator 
ratings data base.  There are only 79 observations for Washington State.  From the results, we can 
see that regardless how many wineries are considered to be neighbors or potential candidates for 
spatial effects (from 1 to 5), according to the Wald, Likelihood Ratio, and Lagrange Multiplier 
tests,  is highly significantly different from zero and has a positive sign
6.  Since from the model 
specification,  is the parameter describing spatial correlation, this result indicates that neighbors 
do  have  significant  and  positive  effect  on  a  winery’s  own  product  price.    Therefore,  good 
neighbors  can  have  beneficial  impact  to  a  winery,  or  we  may  say  that  there  are  positive 
neighborhood effects among Washington State wineries.  This finding is consistent with positive 
                                                             
6 Except “nearest 1 neighbor” is significant at 0.1 level or insignificant in LM test, others are at 0.01 level. 16 
 
spillover theory, and it can be important to potential investors who are interested in developing 
new wineries in Washington State.  
The AIC is used as the criteria for model selection.  For Washington State, the three 
nearest neighbors spatial structure performs best with the smallest AIC of 15.6105.  Consequently, 
in the following discussion, the results we refer to are from this model.  For hedonic regression 
estimates, we obtain similar results as previous studies. Score has significant positive effect on 
price,  indicating  that  expert  evaluations  have  important  influence  on  wine  price.    Case  has 
significant negative impact on price, which is consistent with supply-demand theory: massive 
production may reduce price.  Age affects price positively, which means that as the year of aging 
increasing, wine’s value increases.  For region dummy variables, all of them except Columbia 
Valley
7 are insignificant.  Therefore, for the most cases, regional difference is not obviously 
present in Washington State wine industry, and this is probably the reason why people usually do 
not refer to micro wine production region for Washington State as do when they refer to California 
wine appellations.  
Comparing the estimation results from the spatial model to hedonic regression results 
without considering spatial effects (Column 4 and Column 7 in Table 5); we see that there are not 
many differences.  However, it is still necessary to consider spatial effects when conducting 
hedonic  analyses,  because  from  the  comparison  of  AIC
8,  model  with  spatial  term  is  an 
improvement of simply hedonic regression. 
                                                             
7 Wines from Columbia Valley generate discount comparing to other Washington red wines. 





For California, in the spatial weight matrices, we consider the number of significant  
nearest neighbors K to be between 1 and 65.  We expect for the number of wineries considered as 
neighbors is much greater than that of Washington State because California has more wineries and 
the distance between wineries are generally smaller.  In our data set, there are 876 wineries in the 
Wine Spectator ratings data base for California.  Therefore, the number of wineries within a given 
area is greater compared to Washington, and a winery is likely to have more neighbors that may 
have potential  spatial  dependence.    We find that  the  AIC  statistic  decreases  and reaches  its 
minimum when 35 wineries are considered as neighbors, which is also about 4% of the total 
wineries.  After that, the value of AIC is fairly stable.  
From the estimates of spatial lag parameter  together with the Wald, LR and LM tests, 
we find that good neighbors have significant and positive effects on winery’s product price in 
California.  Further, if we compare this positive spatial effect to its counterpart in Washington 
State, it shows that wineries in California may experience a more apparent neighborhood impact, 
because the probability values of spatial term estimates are all close to zero.  This is the case 
because California has a much longer history and more established reputation for producing wine. 
The nature resources of grape growing are almost fully explored by wine investors, the intensity of 
wineries within a small sub-region is much greater than that of Washington State.  Therefore, the 18 
 
connections among those close wineries are stronger due to this smaller distance between each 
others.  
Among the K nearest neighbors spatial models we estimated for California, the model 
considering 35 nearest neighbors has the best AIC of -3173.595.  Comparing this “best” nearest 
neighbor number to Washington State, where smallest AIC comes from the 3 nearest neighbors 
model, we may conclude that the good neighbor impact is more inclusive for California since a lot 
of  surrounding  neighbors  of  a  winery  can  provide  potential  benefits.   The  following  results 
discussions are based this model.  
Since the dependent variable is the -0.25 power transformation of price, a negative 
sign for parameter estimate indicates a positive marginal effect on price.  From the results, we can 
see that there are similar parameter estimates for the common factors on wine price in California as 
for Washington State: Score and Age have positive effect, while Case affects price negatively.  All 
of the three variables are significant.  However, for macro regions, except SierraFoothills, all other 
regions have significant price premium comparing to generic California red wines.  This finding 
shows that micro region differences are present in California and is consistent with consumer’s 
perception of the area. 
Also, by comparing the spatial model to usual hedonic model, parameter estimates are 
not so much different.  However, the spatial model is better according to AIC criteria.  The AIC of 
the hedonic model without spatial term for California is -3124.117, which is greater than the AIC 
for all other spatial models in this study. 
 19 
 
Further discussions about results 
 
Two interesting points deserve more deep discussions:  (1) Tradeoff between price and 
cost, (2) Long run effects from spatial correlation.  First, spatial estimations for both Washington 
State and California suggest that clustering exists and positively affects price.  These findings 
support the spillover effects from knowledge and reputation.  However, for an entrepreneur who 
wants to start a new winery, this does not necessarily mean choosing the location right next to a 
high reputation winery is the best strategy and will generate maximum profit.  There is a tradeoff 
between higher product price and greater cost.  The land next to high reputation winery may have 
the opportunity of higher wine price, but it is likely that the added value is captured by the land.  
On the other hand, selecting land away from neighbors may cost much less and leave the new firm 
money to invest in other quality-affecting production factors.  This study only focuses on the 
market price but not producing cost.  Consequently, one cannot conclude that locating nearby a 
high reputation winery will guarantee a greater profit. 
Second, from a dynamic point of view, results from this spatial analysis are related to 
the evolution of reputation and quality.  Since locating nearby a high reputation and high price 
wineries may have price advantage, besides high quality wine producers, low quality wine makers 
will also be attracted to this area.  They produce low class wine but enjoy a higher reputation and 
price.  Moral hazard and adverse selection problems may occur, and thus, the location may no 
longer be an effective signal for consumers to distinguish good wines from bad ones.  In the long 
run, the collective reputation of the sub-region will be negatively affected.  Therefore, possible 20 
 
dynamic equilibrium of wine quality for the sub-region tends to be lower than the initial quality. 




This  article  analyzes  spatial  effects  of  winery  locations  on  wine  price  for  both 
California and Washington State.  We first located each winery in our data set accurately on the 
U.S. map to obtain a visual understanding of winery distribution.  Since the precise longitude and 
latitude are available with GIS software, we can identify “neighbors” for each winery, either by a 
distance or nearest criterion.  We use the “K nearest neighbors” approach as the standard to 
describe the neighborhood of wineries for both states, since it is more appropriate to the winery 
distribution. 
From  Global  Moran’s  I  clustering  test,  wine  price  and  score  show  significant 
clustering patterns.  This can be the starting point of spatial analyses and confirm our hypothesis 
about spatial effect among wine producers.  Following the statistical tests, formal models are 
developed for both states.  Spatial econometrics methods are applied and the regression results 
indicate that there exists strong and positive neighborhood effect: if neighbors of a winery had 
price premium, it is likely that the winery also has price advantage.  Therefore, we can conclude 
that good neighbors have important values.  However, the positive spatial effect cannot guarantee 
maximum profit for a new wine producer who is going to locate in a high price neighborhood 
because of the tradeoff between higher wine price and higher land cost.  Also, this good neighbor 21 
 
value may cause lower dynamic quality equilibrium because it will induce moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. 
This article is the first one to consider spatial effects of wineries in the United States.  It 
provides  a  new  way  to  apply  hedonic  analysis  on  wine  price  and  discovers  that  location 




Anselin, L. (1988a). Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht. 
 
Anselin, L. (1998a). GIS research infrastructure for spatial analysis of real estate markets. Journal 
of Housing Research 9, 113–33. 
 
Anselin,  L.  and  Can,  A.  (1995),  Spatial  Effects  in  Models  of  Mortgage  Origination.  Paper 
presented at 91st Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers, March 14–18, 
Chicago. 
 
Can, A. (1996). Weight matrices and spatial autocorrelation statistics using a topological vector 
data model. International Journal of Geographical Information Systems 10, 009–1017. 
 
Can, A. (1998). GIS and spatial analysis of housing and mortgage markets. Journal of housing 
Research 9, 61–86. 
 
Costanigro,  M.,  Mittelhammer,  R.C.  and  McCluskey,  J.J.  (2009),  Estimating  Class-specific 
Parametric Models under Class Uncertainty: Local Polynomial Regression Clustering in a 23 
 
Hedonic Analysis of Wine Market. Journal of Applied Econometrics, Early View 
 
Frizado, J., Smith, B.W., Carroll, M.C. and Reid, N. (2009), Impact of polygon geometry on the 
identification of economic clusters, Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 2, 31 – 44  
 
Garretsen, H. and Peeters,J. (2009), FDI and the Relevance of Spatial Linkages: Do Third-Country 
Effects Matter for Dutch FDI? Review of World Economics, July 2009, v. 145, iss. 2, pp. 319-38 
 
Jaffe, A.B, Trajtenberg, M. and Henderson, R. (1993), Geographic Localization of Knowledge 
Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, 
No.3., 577 – 598 
 
Kaye-Blake, W., O’Connell, A. and Lamb, C. (2007), Potential Market Segments for Genetically 
Modified Food: Results from Cluster Analysis, Agribusiness, Vol. 23 (4), 567 – 582 
 
Noev, N., (2005), Wine Quality and Regional Reputation: Hedonic Analysis of the Bulgarian 
Wine Market, Eastern European Economics, Volume 43, Number 6 / November-December 
2005, 5 – 30 24 
 
 
Porter, M. (2000), Location, Competition, and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global 
Economy. Economic Development Quarterly, Vol.14 No.1, 15-34. 
 
Steiner, B., (2004), French Wines on the Decline? Econometric Evidence from Britain, Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Volume 55, Number 2, July 2004 , pp. 267-288(22) 
 
Stiler, J.F. (2007), The House of Mondavi: The Rise and Fall of an American Wine Dynasty. 
Penguin, New York, NY. 
 
Tobler, W. R. (1970). A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit Region. 
Economic Geography 46: 234–40. 
 
Wallsten, S.J. (2001), An empirical test of geographic knowledge spillovers using geographic 
information systems and firm-level data. Regional Science and Urban Economics 31, 571 – 599 
 
Wu, Y., and Hendrick, R. (2009). Horizontal and Vertical  Tax Competition in Florida Local 




Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of the non-binary variables for Washington and Calfornia 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
State    Price  Score  Case  Age 
Washington 
(N = 79) 
Mean  25.18   86.53   3052.28   2.81  
Min  10.65   78.00   110.00   2.00  
25 quartile  17.86   85.00   296.50   2.50  
Median  23.73   86.67   793.75   2.90  
75 quartile  29.75   88.39   1706.97   3.05  
Max  59.23   92.35   86321.46   4.17  
Std.  10.26   2.88   10153.72   0.52  
California 
(N = 876) 
Mean  34.88   85.40   4498.28   2.83  
Min  5.85   70.00   50.00   1.00  
25 quartile  18.00   83.42   450.00   2.43  
Median  25.58   85.91   975.30   2.93  
75 quartile  38.00   87.62   2764.06   3.09  
Max  1267.78   96.00   328333.33   5.50  
Std.  57.06   3.65   16438.23   0.59  
                     
* CPI adjusted to 2000 26 
 
 
Table 4.2 Brief Descriptions and Abbreviations of Variables 
 
Variables  Short Description  Binary/Non-binary 
Score  Rating Score from Wine Spectator  Non-binary 
Case  Number of Cases Produced  Non-binary 
Age  Years of Aging Before Commercialization  Non-binary 
Napa 








Regions of Production in Washington  Binary 
Yakima Valley 




Table 4.3 Moran’s I Tests for Washington State 
 
Models  Variables  I  Sd (I)  Z  P-value 
1 nearest neighbor  Price  0.582  0.14  4.239  0.000 
Score  0.209  0.139  1.593  0.056 
2 nearest neighbors  Price  0.524  0.099  5.43  0.000 
Score  0.236  0.098  2.538  0.006 
3 nearest neighbors  Price  0.526  0.082  6.603  0.000 
Score  0.287  0.081  3.71  0.000 
4 nearest neighbors  Price  0.502  0.07  7.332  0.000 
Score  0.235  0.069  3.572  0.000 
5 nearest neighbors  Price  0.484  0.062  8.007  0.000 
Score  0.275  0.062  4.677  0.000 28 
 
Table 4.4 Moran’s I Tests for California 
 
Models  Variables  I  Sd (I)  Z  P-value 
1 nearest neighbor  Price  0.454  0.042  10.737  0.000 
Score  0.31  0.042  7.347  0.000 
5 nearest neighbors  Price  0.395  0.02  20.305  0.000 
Score  0.284  0.02  14.635  0.000 
10 nearest neighbors  Price  0.385  0.014  27.824  0.000 
Score  0.272  0.014  19.65  0.000 
20 nearest neighbors  Price  0.377  0.01  38.479  0.000 
Score  0.254  0.01  26.03  0.000 
30 nearest neighbors  Price  0.363  0.008  45.611  0.000 
Score  0.24  0.008  30.208  0.000 
35 nearest neighbors  Price  0.362  0.007  49.345  0.000 
Score  0.24  0.007  32.72  0.000 
50 nearest neighbors  Price  0.342  0.006  56.096  0.000 
Score  0.225  0.006  37.073  0.000 
60 nearest neighbors  Price  0.334  0.006  60.596  0.000 





Table 4.5 Spatial Regression results for Washington State 
 
Variables  Spatial Models 






Intercept  -3.1014   -3.1773   -3.3642  
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Score  0.0625   0.0585   0.0591  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
case  -5.45E-06  -5.15E-06  -5.66E-06 
(0.056)  (0.065)  (0.038) 
Age  0.1482   0.1591   0.1538  
(0.008)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Columbia 
Valley 
-0.2406   -0.2217   -0.2295  
(0.023)  (0.032)  (0.023) 
Yakima 
Valley 
-0.1219   -0.1109   -0.1193  
(0.221)  (0.255)  (0.212) 
Walla Walla 
Valley 
0.1206   0.1043   0.0564  
(0.308)  (0.362)  (0.629) 
Puget  -0.0007   -0.0183   -0.0359  
(0.994)  (0.846)  (0.701) 
Rho  0.1572   0.2770   0.3314  
(0.085)  (0.013)  (0.003) 
Wald test  2.9720   6.1290   8.6570  
  (0.085)  (0.013)  (0.003) 
LR test  2.9180   5.8330   8.1190  
  (0.088)  (0.016)  (0.004) 
LM test  1.9820   5.0480   8.6620  
  (0.159)  (0.025)  (0.003) 
AIC  20.8122   17.8973   15.6105  
 





Table 4.6 Spatial Regression results for Washington State (continue) 
 
Variables       
    4 nearest 
neighbor 
5 nearest 
neighbor  No Spatial 
Intercept  -3.4679   -3.6567   -3.0755  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004) 
Score  0.0603   0.0602   0.0676  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
case  -5.49E-06  -5.09E-06  -5.85E-06 
(0.047)  (0.064)  (0.059) 
Age  0.1482   0.1540   0.1561  
(0.006)  (0.004)  (0.011) 
Columbia 
Valley 
-0.2383   -0.2288   -0.2777  
(0.019)  (0.024)  (0.015) 
Yakima 
Valley 
-0.1254   -0.1208   -0.1351  
(0.194)  (0.208)  (0.209) 
Walla Walla 
Valley 
0.0373   0.0159   0.1840  
(0.760)  (0.897)  (0.132) 
Puget  -0.0481   -0.0585   0.0108  
(0.615)  (0.540)  (0.916) 
Rho  0.3395   0.3989   N/A 
(0.007)  (0.004)   
Wald test  7.2370   8.4290   N/A 
  (0.007)  (0.004)   
LR test  6.8640   7.9440   N/A 
  (0.009)  (0.005)   
LM test  7.5470   8.5740   N/A 
  (0.006)  (0.003)   
AIC  16.8665   15.7856   19.7300  
 
*P-values are in parenthesis 31 
 
Table 4.7 Spatial Regression results for California 
 










Intercept  1.2966   1.2008   1.1998   1.1602  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Score  -0.0097   -0.0093   -0.0094   -0.0093  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
case  5.13E-07  5.12E-07  5.01E-07  5.08E-07 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age  -0.0153   -0.0149   -0.0149   -0.0147  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BayCentral  -0.0299   -0.0302   -0.0317   -0.0341  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Carneros  -0.0534   -0.0525   -0.0526   -0.0510  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Mendocino  -0.0162   -0.0166   -0.0167   -0.0178  
(0.0540)  (0.0460)  (0.045)  (0.031) 
Napa  -0.0443   -0.0384   -0.0372   -0.0345  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
SierraFoothills  -0.0068   -0.0081   -0.0089   -0.0094  
(0.3540)  (0.2650)  (0.219)  (0.195) 
Sonoma  -0.0244   -0.0227   -0.0228   -0.0220  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
SouthCoast  -0.0171   -0.0171   -0.0167   -0.0175  
(0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rho  0.1028   0.2366   0.2494   0.3110  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wald test  19.4190   41.2870   39.4490   51.9940  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LR test  19.1960   40.3260   38.5550   50.4670  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LM test  13.9310   37.8090   44.4240   62.9270  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
AIC  -3139.313  -3160.443  -3158.673  -3170.584 
 
*P-values are in parenthesis 32 
 
Table 4.8 Spatial Regression results for California (continue) 
 
Variables  Spatial Models 










Intercept  1.1493   1.1469   1.14565  1.1461   1.3805  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Score  -0.0093   -0.0093   -0.0093   -0.0094   -0.0101  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
case  5.09E-07  5.07E-07  5.08E-07  5.08E-07  5.40E-07 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age  -0.0146   -0.0145   -0.0145   -0.0146   -0.0158  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
BayCentral  -0.0341   -0.0346   -0.0360   -0.0360   -0.0321  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Carneros  -0.0513   -0.0502   -0.0504   -0.0502   -0.0589  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.064) 
Mendocino  -0.0181   -0.0174   -0.0161   -0.0159   -0.0159  
(0.028)  (0.034)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.000) 
Napa  -0.0341   -0.0338   -0.0335   -0.0330   -0.0503  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.352) 
SierraFoothills  -0.0106   -0.0119   -0.0136   -0.0137   -0.0070  
(0.145)  (0.099)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.000) 
Sonoma  -0.0218   -0.0216   -0.0217   -0.0214   -0.0269  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
SouthCoast  -0.0183   -0.0178   -0.0180   -0.0178   -0.0181  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Rho  0.3345   0.3406   0.3585   0.3649   N/A 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Wald test  54.1350   55.2010   54.3890   53.8100   N/A 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
LR test  52.4740   53.4780   52.7230   52.1660   N/A 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
LM test  69.3190   71.5670   71.3490   71.8850   N/A 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
AIC  -3172.591  -3173.595  -3172.84  -3172.283  -3124.117 
 
*P-values are in parenthesis 33 
 




Figure 0.2 Winery Distribution for California State 
 
 
 